A Critique of Nelson Goodman’s Concept of the New Riddle of Induction Essay

The development of the geometrical regularity of induction has been privy to the symbolizeation and solution of brain-teasers. At the initial aim of its development, it has been privy to the centenarian mystery of induction observed by Hume. later on the solution of the former riddle, however, a new riddle of induction was discovered by Nelson Goodman. In lieu of this, this idea opts to consider the development of the order of induction as a method actingology defined by Hume and Goodmans conception of the Inductive method.Induction refers to a method of argumentation by which a general law or principle is inferred from observed peculiar(prenominal) instances (Flew 171). The method of inducive inference may be considered as the primary means through which justifications be formulated to show the tattleship of show towards particular assumptions (Godfrey 43). The butt against of induction, in this sense, may be seen to arise whenever we take none that evidence lends support to a scheme while in the process failing to establish its deductive certainty. It was much(prenominal) a formulation of the method of induction that changed the conception of the first riddle. What follows is a presentation of the main arguments of the aforementioned(prenominal) riddle as formulated by David Hume.Hume argued that since no prerequisite connections exists amidst empirical phenomena, it is always possible that a approaching observation bequeath prove our inferences wrong no matter how appealing it may withdraw been or how richly support by knightly observations. This problem, in the to a greater extent recent formulations of the problem has been referred to as the uniformity principle in this sense the want of much(prenominal) uniformity. According to the argument, nature has no uniformity. If such is the case, it on that pointby follows that there is no voucher that which ensure the consistency of mans closely refined predictions. It might be a rgued that such an assumption has never been denied in the formulation of predictions however there has been agreement regarding the results of such an agreement or want thereof within the province of induction.To some, it means that induction is never sensible or justify, while to others, it means that induction simply c alls for different standards of legitimateity (Godfrey 63). The last mentioned view strips the aforementioned riddle Humean riddle of its problematic context. This is evident if one considers that since the hulks of deductive harshness be inapplicable to induction, it netnot be a problem that inducive inference is unavoidably attended by the possibility that a future observation may prove it wrong (Goodman 4). The old riddle is indeed dismissed because it cannot possibly be the genuine problem of induction.Fact, Fiction, and Forecast present Goodmans construal of what he refers to as the new riddle of induction. After refuting the old riddle of induction the refutation of which is evident in the former paragraph, Goodman coming back to outline what he takes to be the genuine problem of induction and its doubtful solution. The problem of induction, he writes, is a problem of demonstrating the difference between valid and invalid predictions (Goodman 4). According to Goodman, a prediction is valid if it conforms to a valid rule of induction, and a rule is valid if it yields valid predictions.He acknowledges that such an assumption is characterized by circularity however he acknowledges that it is important to embrace such a conception of the problem in terminuss of the conceptions of justifications for arguments. Goodman notes that inducive predictions based on past regularities work better than those based on any other alternative. If such is the case, the rules for formulating predictions must be constructed in such a way that they depart coincide with common practices of inductive reasoning. This, on the other hand, is further developed by the quality of predictions, which it produces.This is clearly explicated by Rubenstein as he notes, the centerpiece of a valid inductive logic according to Goodman is its reliance on past regularities, and the prescriptive mandate of inductive rigour is inseparable from a descriptive draw of how inductive judgments be usually made (39). This has been the result of Goodmans dissolution of the old riddle of induction. What follows this is Goodmans explication that the most promising solution of the aforementioned riddle is untenable. It is through the interpolation of such untenability that Goodman presents what he perceives to be the new riddle of induction.Goodman presents two hypotheses that are to be addressed through the use of the inductive method. One says that all emeralds are green and the other says that all emeralds are grue, where grue is said to support to all things examined before t just in case they are green but to other things just in case they a re blue (Goodman 10). Both hypotheses seem to be equally well supported by the evidence all emeralds examined prior to t have been plunge to be green and grue. However, the two hypotheses are mutually exclusive. If emeralds are grue, they will be blue at t and thereafter, but if the alternative hypothesis is correct, they will be green. Thus, we are left with the paradox that Goodman christened the new riddle of induction.We cannot, after all, justify induction by appealing to past regularities. However, the reason, according to Goodman, is not the lack of the elusive uniformity principle, but the previously unrecognized ubiquity of regularities. According to Goodman, regularities exist where one finds them. In relation to this Goodman states that one, however, finds them everywhere (Godfrey 53). If such is the case, it therefore follows that it is useless to base inductive validity on past regularities since it is not possible to predict and hence neck which regularities are val id and invalid.At this point, I would like to present a summary of the aforementioned discussion. In the aforementioned discussion, Goodman believes that the old riddle the Humean riddle/the uniformity principle has been dissolved and that induction is justified by past regularities.The only remaining difficulty he sees, however, lies in finding a rule for distinguishing between regularities that do and do not yield valid inductive predictions. As was noted in the above discussion, the possibility of such is not possible. This is evident if one considers that regularity necessitates the occurrence of acts of inductive inference. Therefore, the genuine problem of induction cannot be the distinction between the distinction of regularities that do or do not yield valid inductive predictions since the specification of such necessitates the formulation of inductive inferences.As I reckon, Goodman aforementioned conception fails to account for the process of induction. It is important to note that Goodman contends that induction mothers with regularity. Rubenstein notes, Induction does not begin with regularity it ends with it (44). The failure to consider this leads Goodman to misconstrue the problem of induction. It is important to note that experience of reality does not necessarily start with regularities but alternatively with individual observations. The role of induction, in this sense lies in providing us with justified methods that allows us to posit the observations that we will account for as regularities. Goodman, however, failed to account for this.In addition to this, it is important to note that such a failure can also be traced to Goodmans assumptions regarding the process in which individuals formulate inferences. Goodmans error is compounded when he makes a distinction between identifying regularity and projecting it. Once we have decided that our observations represent regularity, it is automatically project in both temporal directions. This is , in fact, what we mean by applying the term regularity to our data.Furthermore, Stich and Nisbett contend that the equilibrium with inductive practices that Goodman posited, as a necessary aspect in formulating a valid inductive methodology is uncomplete necessary nor sufficient for a rule of inductive inference to be justified (194). They argue that such an assumption fails to consider that human subjects regularly and systematically make invalid inferences and that there an instance wherein human reasoning enables an individual to accept invalid rules and reject valid ones that ought to govern the inference at hand (Stitch and Nisbett 194). In summary, the aforementioned paper presented Goodmans arguments in relation to his conception of the new riddle in induction. Such a riddle, however, under scrutiny may be seen as based upon a mistaken assumption of the justification process of beliefs that necessitates the installation of information garnered through the method of induct ion. This is evident, for example, if one considers the manner in which observations enable the formulation of regularities and not the other way around. An analysis of Goodmans mantic riddle of induction thereby leaves the reader wondering if such a riddle may be considered as a valid bear upon for the adherents of the inductive methodology.Works CitedFlew, Anthony. A Dictionary of Philosophy. London Pan Books, 1983.Godfrey-Smith, Peter. guess and Reality An Introduction to the Philosophy of recognition. Chicago University of Chicago Press, 2003.Goodman, Nelson. Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Massachussets Harvard University Press, 1983.Rubenstein, Arthur. Induction, Grue Emeralds, and Lady Macbeths Fallacy. The Philosophical Quarterly 48.190 (Jan. 1998) 37-49.Stitch, Stephen and Richard Nisbett. Justification and the Psychology of Human Reasoning. Philosophy of Science 47.2 (Jun. 1980) 188-202.